Home-bias Politics, Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth: A Causal Relationship by He, Qichun
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Home-bias Politics, Financial
Deregulation and Economic Growth: A
Causal Relationship
Qichun He
Central University of Finance and Economics
15. October 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34482/
MPRA Paper No. 34482, posted 3. November 2011 06:45 UTC
Home-bias Politics, Financial Deregulation and
Economic Growth: A Causal Relationship
Qichun Hey
Abstract
We re-examine the nance-growth nexus using the Chinese nancial deregulation
experience during the reform period 1981-1998. We use lagged home-bias political
variables as instruments for nancial deregulation. Dealing with weak instruments
by LIML (limited-information maximum likelihood) estimation, we nd that nan-
cial deregulation has a signicant causal e¤ect on economic growth. The result
holds up when we control for conditional convergence, other growth determinants,
and time and province e¤ects.
JEL Classication: O2, C23
Keywords: Financial Deregulation; Home-bias Politics; Causality; Growth
I am grateful to Professor Paul Beaudry for encouraging me to work on the Chinese economy. I also
thank seminar participants at UBC, HKUST, University of Manitoba and Central University of Finance
and Economics, Canadian Economics Association Annual Meeting, All China Economics Annual Meeting
for critical comments on the measurement of nancial deregulation indicators.
yChina Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, No.
39 South College Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China. 100081. Email: qichunhe@gmail.com,
heqichun@cufe.edu.cn.
1
1 Introduction
There is a long-standing debate on the nance-growth nexus.1 Authors such as Robinson
(1952) and Lucas (1988) argue that nance does not cause growth (i.e., nance follows
growth), while others including Schumpeter (1912), McKinnon (1973), King and Levine
(1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that the role of nance in promoting growth
cannot be ignored. Reviewing the literature on the nance-growth nexus, Levine (2005)
concludes: Much work is required to better understand the role of nancial factors in
the process of economic growth.Motivated by Levine, we use the appealing nancial
deregulation experience in the Peoples Republic of China (hereafter China) detailed
later to study whether nancial deregulation has a causal e¤ect on growth.
Chinas nancial deregulation is one of the most important economic events that have
greatly a¤ected the Chinese economy with the largest population and one of the largest
territories in the world. Studying the Chinese experience not only helps to solve the
nance-growth debate (i.e., whether Chinese nancial deregulation simply follows growth
as Robinson and Lucas conjecture or it has a large causal e¤ect on growth), but may o¤er
useful lessons for other countries. There are many other countries that have deregulated
their nancial service over the past several decades.2 However, as a backward poor devel-
oping country that has achieved impressive growth in the nancial deregulation process,
the Chinese experience, especially its gradual approach to nancial deregulation should
o¤er useful lessons for other underdeveloped and transitional economies.
Unlike previous studies on China (see Wei and Wang, 1997; Lardy, 1998; Cull and Xu,
2003; Brandt and Zhu, 2007; Chow, 2004), we re-examine the nance-growth nexus. In so
doing, our study improves over the nance-growth nexus literature in three aspects. First,
we nd a new identication strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of nancial
deregulation policies. The nance-growth debate explains why people may suspect that
Chinese nancial deregulation is endogenous to the growth process. To establish a causal
relationship between nancial deregulation and growth, we use the instrumental variable
(IV) approach and use political variables as instruments for nancial deregulation. This
identication strategy concurs with Levine (2005) who concludes that nance is inuenced
by political, cultural and legal factors. Politics is one of the many important factors that
determine the path of Chinese nancial deregulation (see e.g., Shirk, 2003). Our political
variable is the number of national government department ministers born in each province.
Most of the ministers in our sample have participated in the liberation and the founding
of China. This means they are selected into o¢ ce because of their performance in war
(i.e., exogenous to the growth process). We argue that they have home-bias (i.e., they
favor their birth-provinces) in determining the path of nancial deregulation. We isolate
1Because of Levines (2005) excellent discussion of it, we shall omit detailed references to the literature.
2Typical examples in developing countries are the nancial reforms in Vietnam (Riedel and Turley,
1999) and Morocco and Tunisia (Jbili et al., 1997), and those in industrialized countries include European
Unions Second Banking Directive in 1993 and Japans Big Bangnancial deregulation in 1996.
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the variation of nancial deregulation explained by home-bias politics and nd that it has
a signicant causal e¤ect on growth. The result is robust to controlling for conditional
convergence, other growth determinants, and time and province e¤ects.
Second, comparing to cross-country studies, our analysis uses nancial reforms sys-
tematically implemented across Chinese provinces that are relative more homogenous
and more meaningful to compare. We use dummy variables weighted by population to
quantify Chinas nancial deregulation policies detailed later. Third, Chinas nancial
deregulation was conducted following the gradual approach, generating substantive vari-
ations across time and across provinces in the degree of nancial deregulation, illustrated
in gures 1 to 3. Our analysis exploits the substantive variations. The time variations
allow controlling for unobserved province e¤ects, presenting a robust result.
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 Here]
The estimated magnitude of IV regression is economically signicant for our nancial
deregulation indicators. For example, all else equal, Chinas nancial deregulation on
average has contributed 1.31% to annual growth during our sample period 1981-1998,
which is around 16% of the total average annual growth of China during the period.
The paper is organized as follows. After we briey introduce the Chinese nancial
deregulation, in section 2 we derive the empirical formulation and construct the variables.
Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Chinese Gradual Financial Reform
Before 1978, China was a command economy in which the nancial intermediaries work
under the command of the government. The nancial system is underdeveloped with the
government playing a dominant role (Lardy, 1998, ch. 3; Naughton, 1995, ch. 1). Interest
rates were set administratively; monetary policy was conducted through direct allocation
of credit and renancing. Capital markets were nonexistent. The primary nancial inter-
mediaries were state banks. Believing in the gospel of rapid industrialization, the Chinese
government obliged state banks to lend to the priority sector, the state-owned industrial
sector, with little concern for its protability (see Naughton, 1995; Shirk, 2003).
In 1978, the Chinese government embarked on gradual nancial deregulation aimed at
establishing a market-based nancial system. The Chinese gradual nancial deregulation
studied by previous works (see Lardy, 1998; Naughton, 1995; Shirk, 2003; Brandt and Zhu,
2007) refers to the following. Across time, it involves a gradual implementation of piece-
meal nancial deregulation policies over a long period of time. Common themes of the
piece-meal policies include the provision of more autonomy in credit allocation to state-
owned banks, the removal of restrictions on their ownership structure, and the relaxation
of geographical and legal restrictions on the entry of new nancial intermediaries. Across
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provinces, it refers to a process that allows some provinces to implement some piece-meal
nancial deregulation policies rst. Specically, each year, the government may choose
some nancial deregulation policies and designate some cities and rarely some province(s)
to carry out such policies. After one year or more, the government may spread them to
the whole province, further to several provinces, and nally to the whole country. After
decades of reform, state banks have been built into joint-stock commercial banks; various
markets like money, bond and equity markets have been created. The role of market in
nancial resource allocation has been enhanced. Nevertheless, the objectives of Chinese
nancial deregulation are far from being accomplished, and there are still many unresolved
issues in the nancial deregulation process (see Lardy, 1998; Naughton, 1998). Chinas
ongoing nancial deregulation will continue for a long time.
In China, exogenous political, cultural, institutional, and geographical factors deter-
mine the time and provincial variations in nancial reform policies. Shirk (2003, p.129)
argues that the path of nancial reform in China since 1979 reects a political logic. The
political and cultural factors will be used to isolate the exogenous component of nancial
deregulation in explaining growth, as will be detailed in section 2.3.
2 The Data
2.1 Deriving the Empirical Specication
As is known to all, China has undertaken the market-oriented reform and opening-up
in 1978. That is, China has not only made continuous e¤orts to reform its economic
institutions, but also opened its borders to foreign investors and trade (see Deng, 1975).
Therefore, the Chinese provinces can be treated as backward small open economies that
rely on the absorption of technological expertise from abroad to achieve technological
progress. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 350), for instance, have stated that the
absorption of technological expertise from Hong Kong has been important for Chinas
technological progress. Therefore, we use the technology di¤usion and absorption model
based on Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18) detailed later to derive the empirical formulation.
Acemoglu (2009, p. 614) argues that the absorptive capability of the backward econ-
omy varies across countries because of policy barriers a¤ecting technology adoption. Fol-
lowing Acemoglu, we assume that the absorptive capability depends on nancial deregula-
tion. This is likely because Chinas nancial deregulation, aiming at eliminating existing
nancial distortions and protectionist policies, encourages imitative entrepreneurial activ-
ities. For simplicity, we assume that the absorptive capability of the backward economy
linearly depends on nancial deregulation. Therefore, we use nancial deregulation to
measure the absorptive capability of the backward economy.
For a Chinese province, its aggregate production function for a unique nal good is
Yt = K

t H

t (AtLt)
1   ; (1)
3
where K, H, and L are physical capital, human capital, and raw labor respectively. At
is its level of technology, whose progress will be pinned down later. And g =

At
At
is the
growth rate of technology. The output per e¤ective labor at t is yt = kt h

t , where the
e¤ective capital-labor ratio, kt, and human capital-labor ratio, ht, evolve according to

k = skyt   (n+ g + ) kt (2)

h = shyt   (n+ g + )ht; (3)
where sk, sh are exogenous physical and human capital investment rates respectively.
n and  are exogenous population growth rate and depreciation rate respectively. And
g =

At
At
is the growth rate of technology. The world technological frontier Awt is assumed to
grow at an exogenous rate gw. Following Acemoglu, we posit the following law of motion
for technology:

At = FD  (Awt   At) + At; (4)
where the rst term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (4) measures the absorp-
tion/imitation of world technology and the second term, , measures domestic innovations.
Technology absorption depends on the product of the absorptive capability (measured by
nancial deregulation, FD) and the technology gap between world technology frontier
and the domestic level of technology, (Awt   At).
As in Acemoglu, we dene the inverse of the distance to the world frontier, at < 1, as
at =
At
Awt
. Using equation (4), we have

at = FD   (FD + gw   ) at: (5)
We begin with the steady state. In the steady state, the technological progress rate of
the small economy, g, is equal to gw. And in steady state,

k = 0 and

h = 0. Then steady
state output per e¤ective labor can be solve as
y = (sk)

1   (sh)

1   (n+ gw + ) 
+
1   : (6)
Approximating around the steady state, the speed of convergence is  = (1    ) (n+ gw + ).
Following the steps in Mankiw et al. (1992, p. 423), we end up with
ln (yt)  ln (yt 1) =  
 
1  e  ln (yt 1) +  1  e  ln (y) ; (7)
where ln (y) can be expressed as exogenous parameters as in equations (6). Since the
above equation is output per e¤ective labor, we transform it into output per labor. Output
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per labor is Y
L
, which is equal to yA. Hence we have
ln

Y
L

t
  ln

Y
L

t 1
= [ln (yt)  ln (yt 1)] + [ln (At)  ln (At 1)] : (8)
Combining equations (7) and (8) yields
ln

Y
L

t
  ln

Y
L

t 1
=    1  e  ln (yt 1) +  1  e  ln (y) + g: (9)
The technological growth rate of the small economy, g, is
g =

At
At
=

at
at
+ gw =

1
at
  1

FD + : (10)
According to equation (10), a higher degree of nancial deregulation (FD) will increase
the technological growth rate of the small economy because

1
at
  1

> 0.
Substituting out g using equation (10) and ln (y) using equation (6) from equation
(9), we have our nal empirical specication as
ln

Y
L

t
  ln

Y
L

t 1
=

1
at
  1

FD +     1  e  ln (yt 1)
+
 
1  e  
1     ln (sk) +
 
1  e  
1     ln (sh)
   1  e  + 
1     ln (n+ g
w + ) : (11)
In equation (11), the last four terms are exactly the same as those in augmented Solow
model (see Mankiw et al., 1992). The rst two terms on the RHS of equation (11) are
new and capture the technological progress of the backward economy. A higher degree
of nancial deregulation (FD) would raise the technological absorptive capability of the
backward economy, ending up raising its growth rate. Although it is not emphasized, the
same argument applies to  (the domestic technological advances). A higher degree of
nancial deregulation (FD) would also raise the domestic technological advances of the
backward economy and thereby speed up the growth of the backward economy.
Specically, we use the following formulation for empirical assessment:
growthit = 0 + 1FDit + 2 ln

GDP
L

i;t 1
+ 3 ln(
I
GDP
)it
+4 ln(SCHOOL)it + 5 ln(n+ g
w + )it + ui + Tt + "it (12)
where growthit is the average annual growth of real GDP per worker for ith province
at period t; FD is the measure of nancial deregulation, which is constructed below;
ln
 
GDP
L

i;t 1 , real GDP per worker at the beginning of period t, controls for conditional
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convergence. I
GDP
and SCHOOL measure physical capital investment rate and human
capital investment rate respectively. (n+ gw + ) measures labor force growth. ui and Tt
stand for xed province and time e¤ects respectively.3
We use Chinas cross-province time series data on 27 provinces from 1981 to 1998. Fol-
lowing the common practice in the empirical growth literature, we take six-year averages
of the data to avoid the inuence from business cycle phenomena.
2.2 Constructing Financial Deregulation Indicators
We locate Chinas nancial deregulation policies from the book The Big Economic Events
since Chinas Reform and Opening-up (1978-1998).4 The international symposium or-
ganized by the Chinese Economists Society at the University of Southern California in
1997 divides Chinas nancial deregulation policies as follows:
1. Domestic Financial Deregulation
(a) Reforms of the banking sector:
i. Reforming commercial banks and policy banks;
ii. Regulations of banking institutions in China;
iii. Entry of foreign banks in enhancing competition;
iv. Possibilities of more domestic private banks.
(b) Non-bank Financial Institutions and Regulations:
i. Insurance market;
ii. Non-bank deposit market, and non-bank deposit-taking institutions;
iii. Regulations on gray and black credit market for small loans.
2. Capital Market Development
(a) On Equity and Bond market;
(b) On Foreign Exchange Market.
We quantify all the nancial deregulation policies into one single indicator, denoted
as FD. Following the previous literature that studies banking sector and stock market
separately (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001), we further divide
the nancial deregulation policies into banking/non-bank policies (the policies belong to
the domestic nancial deregulation above), denoted as BANK, and stock market ones
(the policies belong to the above capital market development), referred to as STOCK.
3Solow (2003) discusses the use of the empirical formulation in cross-country regressions (e.g., Barro,
2003) for China.
4There are other books documenting the gradual nancial deregulation policies in China during the
period 1978-1998, but the big events are similar across these books.
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Since most nancial deregulation policies are at the city level, we rst construct the
city level dummy variables. Then we aggregate them to the provincial level, using the
ratios of the citiespopulation to their provincial population as weights:
Index =
X
j
(
X
i
Total Population of City i in 1996
Total Population of the Province in 1996
 I tci + I tp) (13)
where I tci is a dummy variable that equals one if city i receives a nancial deregulation
policy j in year t; I tp is an indicator variable that equals one if a nancial deregulation
policy j is conducted in the province. Adding together all policies (the j
0
s) in and before
year t for all the cities within a province yields its policy index for year t. The data on
the citiespopulation are from the Statistical Yearbook on Chinas Cities.
Using population rather than GDP (gross domestic product) as weight is to lessen
the endogeneity problem of nancial deregulation indicators. An ideal weight should
further consider the quality of the enforcement of the policies. However, nding a quality
measure is a daunting task, hence we leave it to future research. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate
the substantive provincial and time variations in our nancial deregulation index BANK.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our nancial deregulation indexes.
[Table 1 Here]
2.3 Endogeneity and Identication Strategy
Given the debate on the nance-growth nexus, it is not surprising that some suspect that
the logic for the government to conduct nancial deregulation is based on the anticipation
of future growth. To address the potential endogeneity problem of nancial deregulation,
we adopt the IV approach and use political and cultural factors as instruments. Our
identication strategy concurs with Levine (2005) who reviews that many studies suggest
that nance is inuenced by legal, political and cultural factors.
As argued, in China, political, cultural, institutional, and geographical factors deter-
mine the path and logic of nancial deregulation. Shirk (2003, p.129), for instance, argues
that the path of nancial reform in China since 1979 reects a political logic: The actual
pattern of economic reform did not reect economic theories so much as it did the conict
of various kinds of interests, that is the conict, coordination, and balancing of interests
between various trades and industries, between urban and rural areas, between localities,
and between localities and the central authorities.Therefore, politics is one important
factor in driving the path and logic of nancial deregulation. Moreover, culture plays an
important role in determining the path of nancial deregulation. The Chinese culture is
that policy makers tend to give preferential policies to their hometown. We term this as
the home-bias of politicians. We combine the political and cultural factors to build our
home-bias political variable (detailed below).
7
Following the literature on politician turnovers and economics growth in China, we
nd the book entitled Annals of the O¢ cials of the Peoples Republic of China. It
lists Chinas government o¢ cials and their tenure in o¢ ce for all the national government
departments from its founding in 1949 to year 2003. We argue that the bargaining and
coordination of these government o¢ cials of the highest rank, i.e. the ministers of all the
national government departments, plays an important role in determining what provinces
receive the preferential treatment in the process of nancial deregulation. We choose the
ministers, rather than the vice-ministers, of all the national government departments to
represent the distribution of political powers. This is because in the Chinese institutional
framework in which the minister has absolute power over the vice-ministers in making the
nal decisions. Therefore, we nd over 200 ministers for over 100 national government
departments (some of them were closed after 1978 and some were set up after 1978) during
the reform period 1978-1998.
During our sample period 1981-1998, the majority of the national government de-
partment ministers are generals or o¢ cers of the Peoples Liberation Army or important
members of the Chinese Communist Party. They earn their power in war and in the
founding of China. After the founding of China in 1949 when their age was mainly in the
range of 20-40, they continue to work as the national government department ministers
until retirement. Therefore, their selection into o¢ ce was mainly based on their role in
war, which is exogenous to the growth process.
We use culture to assign the national government department ministers to the provinces.
As argued, the ministers are inuenced by the Chinese culture in choosing the designated
cities or provinces to conduct nancial deregulation: they tend to favor the province
where they were born (the aforementioned home-bias of the politicians). Therefore, we
nd the birth-provinces for all the national government department ministers. We build
the province level time series political variable as follows. For instance, during the 1993-
1998 period, the minister of the Ministry of Communications is Zhendong Huang who
was born in Jiangsu province. Therefore, we assign a value 1 to Jiangsu province and
zeros to all the other provinces for our sample period 1993-1998. We repeat the dummy
variable operations for all the national government department ministers. However, sup-
pose minister Huang was in o¢ ce for the period March 1993 to December 1995, then we
would assign Jiangsu province a value that equals the ratio of the number of years he is
in o¢ ce to the number of years in the period 1993-1998 (i.e., 6), which is roughly 0.5 in
this case. Finally, we add up all the dummy variables to get the provincial level political
variable. We repeat the same steps for other two sub-periods. To avoid potential endo-
geneity problem, we use the lagged values of the political variable. For example, the value
of period 1987-1992 is given to period 1993-1998. This makes more sense because it may
take a while for the national government department ministers to bargain over and nally
set up the deregulation policies. Moreover, it takes time to carry out the deregulation
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policies. The substantial province and time variations in our political variable, denoted
by POLITICS, are also illustrated in gures 1 to 3. One can observe that our political
variable is signicantly correlated with our nancial deregulation indicator, BANK.
2.3 Measuring Other Variables
The Chinese GDP data are reliable as Holtz (2003) nds that there is no evidence of
data falsication at the national level. Our dependent variable is the average annual
growth of real GDP per labor. However, there is a large statistical adjustment in 1990
on labor force (detailed in Young, 2003, 1233-1234). Around half of Chinese provinces
made the changed in 1990, which is just the change in statistical caliber as detailed in
Young. Fortunately, Statistical Yearbook of China (SYC) has maintained the original
statistical caliber and provided the data on provincial labor force. Therefore, this more
consistent series provided by SYC allow us to cover the periods before and after 1990 to
avoid spurious labor force growth(Young, p. 1234).
Initial real GDP per worker takes the value of the beginning year of each sub-period.
SCHOOL is measured as secondary school enrollment (student enrollments for middle
schools, grades 7 to 9, and high schools, grades 10 to 12) divided by labor force following
Mankiw et al. (1992). For labor force growth, ln(n + gw + ), we use 0.08 for (gw + ).
That is, we assume a 2% world annual growth and a 6% depreciation rate for China. As
in Mankiw et al. (1992), our result is insensitive to the assumed number for (gw+). I
GDP
is the nominal physical capital investment rate, which is to avoid the deator problem for
investment in China (see Young, 2003). The data are all from SYC.
In sum, our data sample comprises panel data of 27 provinces and 18 years.5 Following
the standard approach in the empirical growth literature, we take six-year averages of the
Chinese panel data to avoid the inuence from business cycle phenomena, producing three
time periods. Table 1 lists the summary statistics of our data.
[Table 1 Here]
3 Estimation Results
3.1 LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) Estimation
We rst use LSDV estimation to test the relationship between growth and nancial deregu-
lation with the three nancial deregulation indexes. That is, we use OLS (Ordinary least
5Among Chinas 31 provincial governments, four are municipalities and four are autonomous regions.
We delegate the usage province to all. Four provinces are dropped due to lack of complete data.
Specically, before 1997, Chongqing was a city of Sichuan province, hence both of them are excluded
from the sample. Hainan was part of Guangdong before it became an independent province. Since there
is a complete set of data for Guangdong, it is kept in the data sample while Hainan is dropped. Tibet is
excluded because there are many missing data.
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squares) estimation that includes 27 province dummies and 3 time dummies. Table 2
summarizes the results.
Column 2.1 in Table 2 reports the OLS results with the banking/nonbank deregulation
index, BANK. One can see that the estimated coe¢ cient on BANK is positive and
signicant at the 5% level. It means a high degree of banking/nonbank deregulation is
associated with a high rate of economic growth. The estimated coe¢ cient on initial real
output per worker is negative and signicant at the 1% level, showing strong evidence
of conditional convergence. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL) is positive and
signicant at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
I
Y

is positive but insignicant
at the 10% level, as in Weeks and Yao (2003). The estimated coe¢ cient on ln (n+ g + )
is negative and signicant at the 10% level. The model ts the Chinese data well.
Column 2.2 in Table 2 reports the OLS results with the nancial deregulation index
(FD) that quanties all the nancial deregulation policies. One can see that its estimated
coe¢ cient is positive. It means a high degree of nancial deregulation is associated with a
high rate of economic growth. However this relationship is insignicant at the 10% level.
Column 2.3 in Table 2 reports the OLS results with the stock market deregulation
index (STOCK). One can see that the estimated coe¢ cient on STOCK is positive,
which is insignicant at the 10% level.
[Table 2 Here]
3.2 Endogeneity and LIML Regression
As discussed, the measures of nancial deregulation may be endogenous to the growth
process. To address the endogeneity problem, we adopt the IV approach and use the
home-bias political variable, POLITICS, and POLITICS-squared as instruments.
In the presence of weak instruments, Hahn and Hausman (2005) show that the ra-
tio between the nite sample biases of 2SLS (two-stage least squares) and OLS with a
troublesome explanator is (see Murray 2006)
Bias
 
2SLS1

Bias
 
OLS1
  l
n eR2 ;
where l is the number of instruments, n is sample size and eR2 is the rst-stage partial
R-squared of excluded instruments. From the rst-stage results in column 3.1 to column
3.3 in Table 3, our n eR2 is always much larger than the number of instruments. These
show that 2SLS regression is favored over OLS. Further, Hahn and Hausman (2005) show
that when the rst-stage partial R-squared of excluded instruments ( eR2) is larger than
0.1, 2SLS is favored over OLS regressions. Our eR2 is larger than 0.1 in columns 3.2 and
3.3. In column 3.1 with banking/nonbank deregulation BANK, the eR2 is slightly smaller
than 0.1. However, from the corresponding second-stage results, the endogeneity test of
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BANK yields a p-value 0.033. It shows the strong endogeneity of nancial deregulation.
Therefore, 2SLS is also favored over OLS.
[Table 3 Here]
The above also shows that the instruments are possibly weak. Andrews and Stock
(2005) state that now the common approach is to use 2SLS if instruments are strong
and to adopt a robust strategy if instruments are weak. In the presence of many instru-
ments, Stock and Yogo (2002) show that LIML (limited-information maximum likelihood)
estimation is far superior to 2SLS. Therefore, we proceed with LIML estimation.
The rst-stage results of LIML estimation are reported in Table 3. One can see
that although POLITICS has a signicant e¤ect on BANK, the F-test on the joint
signicance of POLITICS and its square shows that they jointly have an insignicant
e¤ect on BANK at the 10% level. This conrms the presence of weak instruments. The
F-tests on the joint signicance of POLITICS and its square on FD and STOCK yield
a p-value below 0.1, meaning the political variables jointly has a signicant e¤ect on FD
and STOCK at the 10% level. These justify our use of LIML estimation.
Moreover, from the rst-stage results in Table 3, one can observe that the estimated
coe¢ cient on initial real GDP per worker is insignicant. This actually means that
having better initial conditions (like being richer and having better infrastructure) would
not bring more nancial deregulation policies. In contrast, the estimated coe¢ cient on
physical capital investment rate is signicant at the 1% level. This is not surprising given
that Chinese investment was mainly conducted by the state sectors. Therefore, political
factors, rather than e¢ ciency motives, may drive the physical capital investment of the
provinces (see also Cull and Xu, 2003; Wei and Wang, 1997). Since both physical capital
investment and nancial deregulation are conducted on a political logic, the signicant
e¤ect of physical capital investment rate on nancial deregulation may be due to omitting
other important political factors that are unrelated with our home-bias political variables.
The second stage results of LIML estimation are presented in Table 4. The endogeneity
test always yields a p-value below 5%, showing strong evidence of the endogeneity of
nancial deregulation indicators.
In regression 4.1 in Table 4, the estimated coe¢ cient on BANK remains positive
and signicant at the 5% level. Therefore, the positive relationship between banking
deregulation and growth is causal. Comparing with the OLS result in column 2.1 in
Table 2, the estimated coe¢ cient on BANK becomes much larger in magnitude. This
means the OLS regression under-estimates the signicantly positive e¤ect of BANK on
growth. The weak identication (Cragg-Donald) test statistic is smaller than the Stock-
Yogo critical value for the 25% maximal LIML size, meaning we have the existence of weak
instruments. This further justies our use of LIML regression. The over-identication test
yields a p-value 0.60, which is much larger than 10%. Therefore, we accept the null that
the instruments are valid.
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In regression 4.2 in Table 4, the estimated coe¢ cient on FD remains positive but
becomes signicant at the 5% level. Therefore, nancial deregulation has a signicant
causal e¤ect on growth. Comparing with the OLS result in column 2.2 in Table 2, the
estimated coe¢ cient on FD becomes much larger in magnitude. This means the OLS
regression under-estimates the signicantly positive e¤ect of FD on growth. The weak
identication test statistic is smaller than the Stock-Yogo critical value for the 25% maxi-
mal LIML size, further justifying our use of LIML regression. The over-identication test
yields a p-value 0.32, which supports the validity of the instruments.
In regression 4.3 in Table 4, the estimated coe¢ cient on STOCK remains positive
but becomes signicant at the 10% level. Therefore, stock market deregulation has a
causal e¤ect on growth, which is signicant at the 10% level. Its estimated coe¢ cient
also becomes much larger in magnitude. The over-identication test yields a p-value 0.15,
which supports the validity of the instruments.
[Table 4 Here]
The estimated magnitude of IV regression is economically signicant for the nan-
cial deregulation indicators. For example, using regression 4.1, all else equal, the bank-
ing/nonbank deregulation on average has contributed 1.91% to annual growth during the
period 1981-1998, which is around 24% of the total annual growth of China during the
same period. Similarly, using regressions 4.2 and 4.3, all else equal, nancial deregulation
and stock market deregulation on average have contributed 1.31% and 0.54% respectively
to annual growth during the period 1981-1998.
3.3 Robustness Check
It is not hard to accept that home bias in political decision-making is likely to inuence
the extent of nancial deregulation within any province. However, there may be concern
that the same home bias in decision-making will also inuence other policies that generate
faster economic growth. That is, the instrument may pick up not just the e¤ects of nan-
cial deregulation on growth but other e¤ects as well. Omitting other e¤ects may produce
a bias on our estimated coe¢ cients and even weaken the validity of our instruments. This
concern is valid and applies to other areas of economics that try to isolate the e¤ect of one
particular group of policies like tari¤ reduction on the interested variable. It also makes
any study on the Chinese experience very hard. One can never fully get around this issue,
but we try to minimize the concern by another IV strategy.
As stated in Murray (2006), if one can nd another group of instruments that are
grounded on di¤erent rationales, then she may be able to check the robustness of her
results, provided that all the instruments are valid. Finding one group of instruments
is already tough, nding two groups is much tougher. What we can do is to follow the
review conclusions in (Levine, 2005): This broad spectrum of work suggests that nance
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maybe inuenced by political, legal, cultural, and even geographical factors.That is, we
try to nd some geographical factors as instruments. We have one contemporary weather
indicator, namely, the variation of monthly temperature calculated using the Weather
Yearbook of China and the Natural Resources Database of China Academy of Sciences.
The problem with geographical factors as instruments is that previous literature has
shown that geography may inuence growth via other channels. Moreover, the variation
of temperature has little e¤ect on nancial deregulation, as can be seen from the rst-
stage results in column 3.4 in Table 3. The second-stage results on indicator BANK are
reported in columns 4.4 of Table 4. The estimated coe¢ cient on BANK is signicant
at the 5% level, with a slightly larger magnitude. Our results are also robust to the
combination of other weather indicators (not reported here) and our political variables as
instruments. Moreover, the result is robust with system GMM (Generalized method of
moments) estimation that overcomes the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables
by using the political variables, more weather variables to avoid under-identication,
and the time dummies. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show
that system GMM estimator can dramatically improve e¢ ciency and avoid the weak
instruments problem in the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator.
Therefore, we argue that, all instruments could inuence growth via other channels,
but the component of nancial deregulation explained by political variables, geographical
variables and time variables must be highly correlated with the potential omitted growth
determinant(s) to keep the results robust. It is not unlikely, but it is hard to argue
that this omitted variable bias alone is driving this relationship. At least, one may be
able to say that Chinas market-oriented deregulation (could be nance, could be other
dimensions, and could be every one of them) has a signicant causal e¤ect on growth.
Nevertheless, we deem our study as the rst step towards achieving the nal mission of
isolating the e¤ect of nancial deregulation on growth.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we use the Chinese gradual nancial deregulation experience to re-examine
the nance-growth nexus. Using home-bias political variables to overcome the endogeneity
of nancial deregulation, we nd a signicant causal e¤ect of nancial deregulation on
economic growth. The results are robust to controlling for conditional convergence, other
growth determinants, and time and province e¤ects. Despite that our measurement of
main indicators and the empirical strategy may not be perfect, our study is the rst step
in uncovering the role of Chinas nancial deregulation in promoting growth.
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Appendix: Data on Average Annual Growth Rate, Financial Deregulation and Home-bias Politics
Annual Annual
Province Growth BANK FD POLITICS Province Growth BANK FD POLITICS
Beijing (1981-86) 6.0 1.25 1.25 0 Shandong 7.2 0.19 0.19 6
Beijing (1987-92) 5.0 6.76 7.92 1.5 Shandong 5.7 1.07 1.07 8.2
Beijing (1993-98) 9.5 8.76 11.05 2.3 Shandong 9.5 2.71 2.71 7.9
Tianjin 5.6 1.54 1.54 0 Henan 5.9 0.02 0.02 2
Tianjin 4.2 6.24 7.08 0.4 Henan 3.8 0.16 0.16 2.6
Tianjin 12.0 6.33 7.33 1.2 Henan 7.8 0.12 0.12 2.8
Hebei 6.2 0.42 0.42 9 Hubei 7.5 0.45 0.45 3
Hebei 5.6 1.29 1.29 5 Hubei 4.6 1.81 1.99 1.2
Hebei 9.5 1.26 1.26 5.9 Hubei 10.2 1.97 2.18 5.2
Shanxi 7.7 0.01 0.05 3 Hunan 5.4 0.03 0.03 1
Shanxi 3.5 0.10 0.31 2.1 Hunan 3.4 0.22 0.22 0.4
Shanxi 7.8 0.05 0.27 4.8 Hunan 7.6 0.18 0.18 3.4
Inner Mongolia 7.5 0 0 1 Guangdong 7.7 0.85 0.86 1
Inner Mongolia 4.6 0 0 0 Guangdong 8.9 3.48 3.60 1.5
Inner Mongolia 8.1 0 0 0 Guangdong 9.0 4.70 4.85 3
Liaoning 6.0 0.51 0.55 4 Guangxi 3.6 0.01 0.01 0
Liaoning 4.3 2.40 2.81 1 Guangxi 5.2 0.03 0.03 1
Liaoning 8.2 3.39 3.83 2.6 Guangxi 6.9 0.03 0.03 0.2
Jilin 4.2 0.01 0.01 0 Guizhou 6.5 0 0 1
Jilin 2.6 1.03 1.03 0 Guizhou 2.4 0 0 0.2
Jilin 10.3 2.14 2.14 1.4 Guizhou 5.2 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 2.9 0.03 0.03 0 Yunnan 6.1 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 3.7 0.82 0.95 0 Yunnan 5.1 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 4.9 1.76 1.91 1 Yunnan 6.8 0 0 0
Shanghai 6.3 1.79 3.29 2 Shaanxi 6.6 0.14 0.14 1
Shanghai 6.6 8.40 15.73 3.2 Shaanxi 4.3 0.97 0.97 0.6
Shanghai 11.7 11.49 20.49 7.5 Shaanxi 6.3 0.93 0.93 2.5
Jiangsu 7.9 0.49 0.49 8 Gansu 5.1 0 0 1
Jiangsu 7.9 1.86 1.86 6.6 Gansu 4.7 0.10 0.10 0.5
Jiangsu 11.0 2.86 2.93 10.3 Gansu 6.5 0.06 0.06 0
Zhejiang 8.2 0.57 0.57 3 Qinghai 6.5 0 0 0
Zhejiang 6.8 2.08 2.08 5.4 Qinghai 2.2 0.24 0.24 0
Zhejiang 11.0 3.13 3.13 6.1 Qinghai 5.8 0.24 0.24 0
Anhui 6.9 0 0 4 Ningxia 6.7 0 0 0
Anhui 2.0 0.29 0.29 1.8 Ningxia 3.2 0.11 0.11 0
Anhui 9.6 1.25 1.25 5.1 Ningxia 5.0 0.11 0.11 0
Fujian 6.0 0.60 1.43 3 Xinjiang 8.7 0.01 0.01 0
Fujian 6.9 2.95 2.95 2.26 Xinjiang 7.2 0.17 0.17 0.5
Fujian 10.7 5.11 5.16 1.7 Xinjiang 6.3 0.13 0.13 1
Jiangxi 6.0 0.33 0.33 2
Jiangxi 5.2 1.29 1.29 0
Jiangxi 6.5 2.25 2.25 0.6
Note: Growth rates are in percentage.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
growth (annual, %) 6.47 2.26 2.00 12.00
BANK 1.41 2.24 0 11.49
FD 1.73 3.34 0 20.49
STOCK 0.33 1.31 0 9
POLITICS 2.19 2.53 0 10.3
ln(Y/L)t 1 7.39 0.62 6.21 9.42
ln(SCHOOL) 2.25 0.24 1.76 2.84
ln(I/Y) 3.67 0.22 3.14 4.32
ln(n+ gw+) 2.32 0.14 1.93 2.61
Observations: 81. The data are six-year averages for 27 provinces.
Except for growth, BANK, FD, STOCK and ln(Y
L
)t 1, all other variables are
multiplied by 100 and then taken logarithms.
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Table 2. LSDV Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
Dep. Var.: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP per worker 1981-86, 1987-92, 1993-98
Regression number
Independent Variable 2.1 2.2 2.3
BANK
0.40
(0.17)
FD
0.18
(0.11)
STOCK
0.07
(0.26)
ln
 
Y
L

i;t 1
 5.24
(1.85)
 4.76
(1.90)
 4.71
(1.98)
ln (SCHOOL)
4.67
(1.69)
4.76
(1.75)
5.12
(1.80)
ln
 
I
Y
 0.40
(2.50)
1.10
(2.60)
2.77
(2.61)
ln (n+ g + )
 4.82
(2.15)
 5.26
(2.20)
 5.58
(2.25)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.84 0.83 0.82
Observations 81 81 81
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 3. Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
First-stage results.
Regression number
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
First-stage dependent variable as
Independent Variable BANK FD STOCK BANK
POLITICS
0.43
(0.24)
0.65
(0.37)
0.23
(0.16)
0.44
(0.24)
POLITICS-squared
 0.02
(0.02)
 0.03
(0.04)
 0.001
(0.02)
 0.02
(0.02)
ln
 
Y
L

i;t 1
1.22
(1.60)
 0.27
(2.45)
 1.49
(1.08)
1.39
(1.64)
ln (SCHOOL)
1.24
(1.43)
2.13
(2.19)
0.89
(0.96)
1.26
(1.44)
ln
 
I
Y
 5.97
(1.92)
9.76
(2.94)
3.79
(1.29)
5.98
(1.94)
ln (n+ g + )
 1.66
(1.80)
 1.25
(2.76)
0.41
(1.21)
 1.63
(1.82)
Variation of Monthly Temperature
0.01
(0.02)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments 0.0807 0.1049 0.1139 0.0874
Bias(2SLS1 )
Bias(OLS1 )
 l
n eR2 26:54=0:31 28:50=0:24 29:23=0:22 37:08=0:42
F-test on excluded instruments:
(prob. of F)
2.02
(0.144)
2.69
(0.078)
2.96
(0.062)
1.44
(0.245)
R2(centered) 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.89
Observations 81 81 81 81
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 4. LIML Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
Second-stage Results.
Regression number
Independent Variable 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
BANK
1.36
(0.60)
1.42
(0.59)
FD
0.76
(0.35)
STOCK
1.63
(0.87)
ln
 
Y
L

i;t 1
 6.27
(1.94)
 4.61
(1.820)
 2.63
(2.30)
 6.33
(1.98)
ln (School)
3.38
(1.84)
3.32
(1.86)
3.37
(2.05)
3.29
(1.88)
ln
 
I
Y
  6.01
(4.56)
 5.27
(4.40)
 3.84
(4.40)
 6.42
(4.56)
ln (n+ g + )
 3.03
(2.39)
 4.29
(2.18)
 5.89
(2.29)
 2.91
(2.43)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Endogeneity test (p value) 0.033 0.038 0.028 0.019
Weak Identication Test
Stock-Yogo Critical value:
25% maximal LIML size
2.02
3.92
2.70
3.92
2.96
3.92
1.44
3.32
Over-identication test p-value 0.60 0.32 0.15 0.84
R2(centered) 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.71
Observations 81 81 81 81
Note: Endogenous variable in 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are BANK, FD and STOCK respectively.
Instruments used in 4.1-4.3: POLITICS and POLITICS-squared.
Instruments used in 4.4: POLITICS and POLITICS-squared and the variance of temperature.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
Figure 1. Provincial Variation in Banking Deregulation and POLITICS (1981-86)
Figure 2. Provincial Variation in Banking Deregulation and POLITICS (1987-92)
Figure 3. Provincial Variation in Banking Deregulation and POLITICS (1993-98)
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